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Abstract 
Crowdfunding is an emerging international financial 
activity often performed via internet mediated platform. 
With the rapid growth of this financial system, rising 
risks would influence participant’s decision making. In 
this study, we examine the process of a typical 
crowdfunding activity, pre-ordering pledging as well as 
its coming risks. Based on the analysis, we combine 
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and General Bass 
Model (GBM) to build decision-making models for 
pre-ordering pledging theoretically where risk factors 
are taken into account. Finally, evolutionary game 
simulation system is built to simulate the dynamic 
decision-making behavior in a risk changing 
environments. The simulation results demonstrate that 
the currency exchange rate give great impact on 
international participant’s decision-making behavior in 
crowdfunding. Low exchange rate brings less 
investment decision from the investor and high 
exchange rate leads to overheated investment which 
challenges funder’s diligence.  Project system risk 
may infest the participant’s decisions-making process 
and cause ambiguity at the end. Limitation and 
managerial suggestions are discussed.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
With the development of internet technology and 
internet finance, new firms and creative projects find a 
new way to raise money through an internet platforms 
called crowdfunding platform. It allows the funders to 
collect money from a great number of individuals; 
meanwhile the individuals can invest any creative 
projects presented in the crowdfunding platform. The 
concept of crowdfunding developed from 
crowdsourcing, which collects information, funds and 
idea resources from individuals. It allows the public 
participates in different programs through the internet 
platform. Recent years, crowdfunding has attracted 
investors’ attention for several reasons. It not only 
achieves self-satisfactory for personal interests, but is 
also associated with production priority, project 
involving, future benefit and control power [1, 2]. 
It is widely believed that crowdfunding has great 
potency to benefit innovation [3], entrepreneurship [4], 
sustainability [5] and smart cities [6]. With the rapidly 
development of internet finance, crowdfunding plays 
an increasingly important role in economy. Thus, 
crowdfunding platforms develop rapidly and globally. 
In 2014, the most famous crowdfunding site, 
Kickstarter, has attracted 7.7 million investors all over 
the world to help launching 77,000 creative projects [7]. 
Furthermore, the total number of international 
crowdfunding projects is also increasing every year [8]. 
However, potential risks arise when crowdfunding is in 
a rapid expansion. The participating motivations in 
crowdfunding have attracted many scholars’ attention 
[9]. Decision-making process in crowdfunding has 
become an important research area in recent years. 
Transaction costs, reputation, market design [10], and 
geographic factors [11] are believed to be of 
significance on decision-making process. Various 
potential risks may have great influence on investor’s 
decision-making process in crowdfunding. However, 
most of the recent studies for decision-making under 
risk analysis focused on the perspectives of laws [12] 
or historical cases [13] qualitatively. It is necessary to 
analyze the decision-making process with risk factors 
in crowdfunding quantitatively for the purpose of 
understanding to what extent risk factors influence the 
decision-making process and how decision makers 
respond to the changes in risk factors.  
In this paper, we analyze the risks theoretically 
and develop typical analytical decision-making models 
for crowdfunding. An evolutionary game simulation 
system is built to simulate the dynamic 
decision-making process for crowdfunding activities in 
risk changing environments based on system dynamics 
in order to analyze the impact of risks on 
decision-making behavior quantitatively. 
 
2. Related works 
 
2.1 Decision making in pledging 
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In the studies of decision-making in pledging, 
researchers believe that pre-ordering pledging is 
preferred in the early period when pledging demand is 
smaller than its market size, or the profit-sharing is 
preferred [14]. Promise of long-term benefit and 
illustration of the project’s social attributes play a 
crucial role in project financing [15]. In addition, 
Kuppuswamy and Bayus [16] pointed out supportive 
investors’ increment is negative related to the existing 
investors. Although these researches tried to analyze 
decision makers’ behavior, they mainly focused on 
successful investment behavior and ignored the risks 
that brought to crowdfunding. In crowdfunding, mass 
individuals make decisions with more efficient 
information and experience, which requires the study to 
consider multiple conditions.  
Risk investigation is also worth noticing while 
success factors are studied, so that the issues could be 
analyzed objectively. Therefore, it would be reasonable 
and necessary to ask the following two questions. What 
is the impact of risk factors on crowdfunding activities? 
And how participants react according to the alteration 
of risk factors? This study will analyze the risk factors 
in crowdfunding on the base of classical theoretical 
model, in order to fill the gap in theoretical risk 
research. 
 
2.2 General Bass Model  
 
The Bass Model [17], refer as the General Bass 
Model (GBM), is a classical method which could be 
used to analysis adoption and substitution for 
successive generations of high-technology products  
[18]and new products [19]. In GBM, the parameters 
can be estimated, and fitting without decision variables, 
therefore, GBM has been widely used in empirical 
studies [20, 21]. Today, Bass model is still widely used 
in the research of innovation, technology diffusion and 
marketing. Kumar [22] proposed energy models to 
enhance knowledge and skills in the efficient transfer 
and management of technology for optimally allocating 
different types of technology feasibility Bertorri [23] 
introduced a network structure into the Bass Model and 
investigated numerically the dynamics in the case of 
networks with different link density. In information age, 
Bass Model also fits to capture the underlying 
mechanism of information diffusion on SNS (Social 
Network Site). Shen [24]  figures out that the Basic 
Bass Model captures the underlying mechanism of 
topic development process of the SNS such as Twitter.  
 Although GBM has various advantages in the 
study of purchasing new products or adopting 
technologies, the perspective of GBM is unidirectional. 
It cannot provide a research path on the sale side. In 
order to expand the applications of GBM, other 
classical methods are combined with GBM. Combined 
with Grey theory, more effective and accurate forecast 
can be made [25]. Combined with simulation, the 
research works based on Bass Model not only focus on 
forecast but also has been proved effective under 
different contexts [26]. In the study of decision making, 
GBM may combine with another suitable model to 
analyze diffusion problem on internet. 
 
2.3 Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
 
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is the basic 
concept in Evolutionary Game Theory, which was 
originally considered for biological evolution, but now 
is widely used in behavioral ecology and economics. It 
considers a large population of bounded rational 
players playing a game repeatedly through time, and 
players learn from the experience to improve their 
strategy [27, 28]. ESS has theoretical and practical 
guidance in digital age. Recently, ESS was used to 
analyze construction safety investment [29], trust 
decision, adaptive selection of cryptographic protocols 
in WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks), and resource 
allocation, etc.  Shen [30] studied the dynamics of a 
sensor node making a trust decision that will determine 
whether to cooperate with others, with the purpose of 
disclosing this evolutionary process. Based on 
Evolutionary Game Theory, Arora [31] propose an 
adaptive security model for WSNs to select 
cryptographic protocols during runtime. When 
considering an effective way to employ D2D 
communications for secondary users, Cheng [33] 
adopted replicator dynamics in Evolutionary Game 
Theory to model the users’ behaviors.  
Compared to the classical game theory, 
Evolutionary Game is more suitable for studying the 
problem in digital age. Thus, the ESS can possibly 
address the mass decision making issues with less 
asymmetric information on the internet, such as 
crowdfunding. However, this theory does not offer 
efficient method to address the problems of decision 
making mutation in the game. 
 
3. Crowdfunding and risk analysis 
 
3.1 Framework of crowdfunding 
 
Crowdfunding Platform (CFP) is an online site 
that allows funders to show projects on it for raising 
money. Funders provide information of the 
crowdfunding projects, such as business plans, photos, 
and videos and updated processing information when 
the crowdfunding application is approved by the 
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platform. The backers, who are interested in the 
crowdfunding projects, could get the information from 
the CFP and decide to invest/purchase them or not. 
Pre-ordering pledging is a typical and preferred 
pledging form in crowdfunding
pledging, investors receive the confirmation of 
products/services from funders after purchasing the 
project. Investors are able to evaluate the received 
products/services as well as share their purchase 
experience on crowdfunding platform, project 
community or SNS. If most of the purchase 
experiences are positive, other investors will be more 
likely to purchase this project. Otherwise, their desires 
to purchase the project will decline. 
Figure 1 shows the process of pre
pledging in crowdfunding. If a backer chooses to 
purchase or invest a project, the data will be recorded 
on CFP.  
Figure 1 Process of pre-ordering pledging
CFP is a workplace for information transaction 
and data saving, which helps funders and backers to 
match each other. By pledging, backers gain stock 
share and chance to participate in program managing, 
such as selecting stockholder representative to 
guarantee the normal operation of the 
expected dividend, and finally receive 
However, in some non-profit projects, backer
investment could be considered as 
This case will not be discussed in this paper.
process, backers can learn from each other’s
(Exp.), so do the funders. With CFP, both backers and 
funders can get more information (Info.) in the repeated 
crowdfunding from each side.  
 
3.2 Risk analysis in crowdfunding
 
Risk factors in crowdfunding  
Due to its special business process and mode, the 
rapid growth and internationalization of crowdfunding 
bring two major investment risks which 
environmental factors and business factors, respectively. 
Most of the projects in crowdfunding are related to 
technology and art. Investors are relatively dispersive 
and have personal motivations for investment.
Consequently, the risks brought by environmental 
. In pre-ordering 
-ordering 
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the return. 
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 In this 
 experience 
  
caused by 
 
factors do not bring serious threats.
environmental factors, business factors 
risks but they are are easier to be managed and 
recognized by carrying out risk management.
should effectively prevent the risks brought by business 
factors, or they will lead to develop 
even industry recession. Generally, r
factors in crowdfunding 
participants, projects and pledging process, 
information security, backer’s decision
behavior, funder’s credit and 
related to project pledging 
investment, such as the return rate, investment 
threshold, and currency exchange rate when foreign 
backers invest the project. 
 
Risk management in crowdfunding platform
     Crowdfunding platform has taken measures to 
deal with the potential risk caused by business factors. 
1) Risk management before pledging: Projects 
Selection 
Before the pledging project is established, funders 
are required to provide
information and valid introduction about the 
pledging project. CFP will verify all the applied 
crowdfunding projects and reject high risking 
projects to guarantee a high success ratio of 
crowdfunding projects. 
2) Risk management during pledging: financing rules
When the project is established, CFP will control 
the overall risk of the project by applying the 
financing systems. There are two systems in 
financing form: All or Nothing (AoN) and Keep it 
All (KiA).Under AoN system, mon
from contributors if a pre
been achieved. If the goal is not met, no money is 
collected. In KiA, all of the money is collected 
without return regardless of the pledging goal is 
achieved or not [33]. 
3) Risk management after pledging: information 
disclosure 
If a project has pledged 
required to update the project’s latest information 
and post the information in the most conspicuous 
places to capture backers’ attention. Funders can 
also pass the latest information, texts, pictures and 
video clips to the backers on his SNS, in the 
project’s community or by other interaction 
channels. 
 
4. Decision-making 
crowdfunding 
 
In crowdfunding, backers and funders make 
 Compared to 
bring more 
 CFP 
restrictions and 
isks of business 
are uncertainties of 
including 
-making 
operating ability. Factors 
may also bring risks in 
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decisions as a repeated game. Individual decision 
maker interact and exchange information with each 
other through SNS, CFP and other interaction assisted 
tools. He or she learns from others’ experiences again 
and again to form his or her own decisions. Backers 
make decisions with the help of experience learned 
from feedback. Funders can also notice the reaction of 
backers when feedback is received by the backers. 
More details of decision-making process will be 
considered in the typical crowdfunding game model. 
 
4.1 Combination of ESS and GBM 
 
In the pledging game process, what we are facing 
is a multi-objective decision-making problem. Both 
funders and backers have to be considered together and 
each side’s decision-making is affected by the other 
side.   
GBM can be used to analyze internet related 
problem with the condition of mass decision making. 
Thus, it is suitable for modeling the group decision 
making behaviors. However, as discussed, the 
perspective of GBM is unidirectional; it cannot provide 
a research path on the funder side in the process of 
crowdfunding. It cannot be used to analyze the related 
influence between two decision-making groups (bakers 
and funders) in crowdfunding. As we mentioned above, 
the decision-making process in crowdfunding is 
regarded as a game. Compared to other approaches, 
ESS takes a large population of bounded rational 
players into consideration, which just meet our 
requirements and is a suitable strategy to provide 
solutions for multi-objective decision-making problem 
in game. Therefore, we consider using GBM to build 
the multi-objective group decision-making model and 
applying an evolution based game ESS to improve the 
decision-making model as well.  
Based on GBM, we argue that the general 
equation for describing the process of adopting new 
products in population could also model the 
per-ordering decision making behavior for purchasing 
new products or services in crowdfunding. 
        
 
 
 
1
f t
p qF t
F t
 

          
(1) 
Where  f t is the rate for change of the purchase 
penetration, F(t) is the purchase penetration, p is the 
coefficient of innovation and q is the coefficient of 
imitation. 
Then we introduce an evolutionary based game, 
ESS. In this game, there are two strategies S1 and S2 
for backer. S1denotes “purchase” and S2 denotes “not 
purchase”, x  is the proportion to choose purchase 
with mass backers. Similarly, y is the proportion to 
choose the first strategy for funders in a mass. Refer to 
the replicator dynamic [34] as the strategy reply in ESS, 
the replicator dynamic equation for backers is: 
   
    1 1 21
dx
x E E x x u u
dt
    
     
(2) 
Where t is the time, 1u  is the revenue of S1, 2u
is the revenue of S2, x is the proportion of backers 
who choose purchase (S1), 1E  is the expected revenue 
of S1, E is the average expected revenue of the 
population. Based on the above discussion, we notice 
that x  and F(t) have the similar meaning. Set x=F(t), 
the replicator dynamic can be expressed as: 
  
         1 21
dx
F t f t F t F t u u
dt
             (3) 
From equation (1), the rate of change of the 
purchase penetration be expressed as:  
       1 1f t F t F t q F t p                
(4) 
If  1 2u u q  , equation (3) and equation (4) 
would have the same expression form. In the GBM, q is 
the coefficient of imitation in GBM which represents 
external factors for purchasing a new product. 
Moreover, 1 2( )u u is the extra revenue of purchasing 
which also represents one kind of external factors. 
Theoretically, replicator dynamic can be explained as 
the external influence of purchasing decision in the 
GBM when revenue is the only external factor 
considered. In other words, the replicator dynamic 
expresses the imitation of decision makers who learn 
from experience revenue receiving, and the extra 
revenue expands the changing ratio in decision-making. 
Both GBM and ESS have drawbacks. The 
replicator dynamic has shown the imitative rule for 
bounded rational decision makers with experience, 
probably, rational enough for mass backers or funders. 
As the bounded rational hypothesis is limited, we will 
consider the irrational decision for improvement. The 
replicator dynamic needs to be expanded with another 
decision-making relationship which does not consider 
the revenue as the mutation in the game.  
In economics, the decision making without profit 
consideration is regarded as irrational. In equation (4), 
p is the coefficient of innovation which denotes internal 
factors. The innovative purchase was motivated by 
individual reasons (internal factors) only. Without 
major consideration of profit, p represents irrational 
factors. It is noticed that the other part of equation (4),
 1 ( )F t p , represents the irrational factors influence 
on purchase decision making in economic perspective. 
As the game is dynamic, the coefficient of 
irrationally decision-making should not be fixed as the 
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setting in GBM, but changing with the strategy 
proportion which refers to Evolutionary Theory. 
Setting the relation of irrationally decision-making and 
the proportion of S1 is pP(F(t)), where p is the risk 
variable from individuals which shows the uncertain of 
irrationally decision-making. P(F(t)) is the relation 
function of F(t) and p. pP(F(t))represents the mutation 
of strategy choice which does not be considered in the 
replicator dynamic equation (2) or (3). In this paper,  p 
is negatively correlated with the decision consistency, 
that is, if the decision makers almost choose the same 
strategy, irrationally decision-making behavior will 
decrease and everyone’s choice is more profitable. 
Based on the above discussion, relation function can be 
set as: 
        
    1 1 2P F t F t  
          
(5) 
Combine equations (3), (4) and (5), the rate of the 
purchase penetration changes where both rational and 
irrational decisions are considered in a repeated game is 
presented as: 
            1 21 u 1f t F t F t u F t pP F t               (6) 
Substitute equation (5) into (6), we have: 
            1 2 1 11 u 21f t F t F t u t FF tp               
(7) 
   Equation (7) shows a general expression form for mass 
decision-making which take both rational and 
irrational decisions into consideration in a repeated 
game. It is a general discrete decision-making model in 
crowdfunding. It will be used for pre-ordering game 
modeling later. 
 
4.2 Decision-making modeling for pre-ordering 
pledging 
 
Assumptions and parameters used for modeling 
Before building the decision-making model for 
pre-ordering pledging, we have the following 
assumptions.  
1)  Decision makers are bounded rational. 
2) ( )f t presented in equation (6) is used to model the 
decision-making changes. 
3) For clarity of comparison, all the returns are 
calculated as NPV. 
4) Information is efficient. 
    We assume there is infinity of potential backers 
(investors or purchasers). Crowdfunding projects are 
open to international investment. Backers use domestic 
currency DC to invest/purchase the project. 
Crowdfunding projects use foreign currency FC as the 
settlement currency. 
Definition 4.1: Let  1 2,B B BS S S be the backer’s 
investment strategy 1BS denotes backer’s choice of 
investing the project and 2BS denotes backer’s choice 
of not investing the project. The probability of each 
choice is denoted by 1b and 2b respectively, 1 2 1b b  . 
Definition 4.2: Let x be the ratio of backer who accept 
the creative project or investment choice. x reflects 
backer’s investment decision in crowdfunding.  
Definition 4.3: Let  1 2,F FFS S S be the funder’s 
service strategy. 1FS denotes high cost and high return 
are promised by the funder and 2FS denotes low cost 
and low return. The probabilities of each strategy is 
denoted by 1a and 2 1 2, 1a a a  . 
Definition 4.4: Let y be the ratio of hard-working 
funders. y reflects funder’s return decision in 
crowdfunding. 
Given a crowdfunding project, with m potential 
backers, the average investment from backers is 0C , 
the pre-determined target is set to w , and 0t denotes 
the time used for pledging, w denotes the actual 
amount of capital be raised. The actual pledged capital 
is calculated for the two financing systems separately. 
In KiA system 
              0 0t
w x mC
             
(8) 
In AoN system 
         
0 0
0
0 0
0
,
0,
t t
t
x mC x mC w
w
x mC w

 
       
(9) 
In pre-ordering pledging modeling, four major 
risk factors will be taken into consideration in 
decision-making process. They are irrational 
decision-making risk from both backers xp and funders
yp , currency exchange rate e and pledging system 
risk . 
Definition 4.5: Let te be the currency exchange rate at 
t , /
t
e FC DC . t is the change of te at time t , 0e is 
the initial rate, 0
0
t
t te e   .  
Pre-ordering Game modeling 
This study chooses Kickstarter’s working mode to 
launch decision-making modeling. As the most famous 
pre-ordering crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter 
established in U.S. and it is the largest synthesized 
crowdfunding platform. In 2014, 3.3 million people 
that all over the world has pledged more than half a 
billion dollars (that's $1,000 in every minute) to support 
22,252 creative projects. Backers are welcome to invest 
their preferred programs via the platform, but only U.S. 
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dollars or GB pounds are accepted as the settlement 
currency. Therefore, foreign currency 
may bring risk to the investment of crowdfunding.
Kickstarter adopts the financing mechanism of 
AoN. Funders need to establish a pre
and a deadline for the pledging. The raised capital 
be refunded if the target cannot be 
Commonly, Kickstarter charge 5% of the fund and 
Amazon, the capital operating partner, woul
another 3-5%. The pledging project will be recorded 
online for reference. 
As to the modeling of pre-ordering, participants in 
Kickstarter are completely in conformity with the 
characteristics of repeated gaming. In addition, 
database and credit system established
recording, provide references for decision makers to 
learn from.  
This part proposes a pre-ordering game to analyze 
the impact of risks on decision
pre-ordering funders, if the collected capital reache
pre-determined target w , the funder w
money to reach the most efficiency level and provide 
high quality or return  HR with the minimum cost
minC . If the collected capital does not reach
funder will choose to offer high return
cost  HC or low return  LR with low cost
denotes the project operation risk factor. In this study, it 
is the posterior probability of reaching the efficiency 
level in pre-ordering pledging.  
LHC C C 
H LR R  
Considering the probability and the 
similar lemons problem in crowdfunding, ESS would 
change with the time delay in discrete replicator 
dynamics. It implies that the probability of choosing 
strategy 2FS  will increase with time and
revenue for backers will be reduced,
purchase penetration will be reduced
Finally, total revenue for funders 
when the funders choose 1SF , the purchase penetration
is  1xF t  , and if the funders choose
purchase penetration is  xF t . It is 
discrete analogue of the GBM, in this model, time 
delay is accurate. Before the game, funders 
the pre-ordering price 0C  in currency 
confirmatory is returned. Backers 
probability of strategies chosen by 
exchange rate 
 
-determined target 
will 
achieved in time. 
d collect 
 by project 
-making. For the 
s the 
ill get enough 
w , the 
 HR  with high 
 LC .
min  
process of a 
 the expected 
 and then the 
 accordingly. 
is reduced. So that 
 
2FS , the 
approximated in the 
will give 
FC and the 
do not know the 
funders. In each 
round, backers and funders make decisions 
experiences and revealed information
(6) to model decision-making changes
of events occurred in the game is presented as follows
1) Backers make their decisions
2) Projects start to raise capital 
platform. 
3) When pledging is accomplished
the project and make the return decision
4) Backers receive the return, shar
and go back to step 1). 
Using AoN financing
the pledged capital successfully 
assume that  successful 
more likely to reach the efficiency level in 
consider as 1  . The game tree and the 
are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Pre-ordering 
revenue
In pre-ordering game, 
      1x x x t tf t F t F t ye R R R e C e      
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1 1
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xm C F t C F t


   
           
 
Let ( ) 0yf t  , here is F t

  0 min 1
y y y
x x y
p P F t
x
C C m F t F t F t


    
 
5. Simulation and results analysis
 
Analytical solution of pre
that the correlations among ESS, returns and risk 
factors are extremely complex. Therefore, we propose a 
from past 
. We use equation 
. The Sequence 
:  
. 
on the crowdfunding 
, funders operate 
. 
e the experiences, 
 mechanism, projects get 
when w w  .We 
crowdfunding projects are 
AoN, 
revenue 
game tree and the 
 
 
    
0 0
1
H L L
x x x xF t p P F t
 
(10) 
( ) 1,0x  or 
  
 
         (11) 
    
   
    
1
1
x x
H L
x x
y y y yF t p P F t
  
 
  
   
(12) 
( ) 1,0y  or  
 
    
 
 
-ordering game implies 
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numerical case simulation and test the impact of risk 
factors on decision-making process in pre
game in the following. 
 
5.1 Simulation model and parameter setting
 
 Based on the system dynamics
builds evolutionary game simulation system to simulate 
the dynamic decision-making in a risk changing 
environments. 
 
Table 1 System parameter settings
Parameters Settings Descriptions
e Initial value 5 Currency exchange rate
x 
Initial value 
0.5 
Ratio
purchase projects
y 
Initial value 
0.5 
Ratio of 
C0 10 Pre
Cmin 0.5*C0 M
RH Cmin*2.15 
CL Cmin*1.5 
RL                          Cmin*1.8
delta e 
e*RANDOM 
UNIFORM(-0
.05,0.05, 0.001) 
Changes of exchange rate
fx 
Follows 
equation (10), 
Rate of the “purchase” 
penetration changes from 
fy 
Follows 
equation (12) 
Rate of the 
penetration changes from 
pxP(x) 
RANDOM 
NORMAL(-0.
01,0.01,0,0.003, 
0.005)*(1-ABS(
1-2*x)) 
Influence of irrational 
decision risk from  backers
pyP(y) 
RANDOM 
NORMAL(-0.
01,0.01,0,0.003, 
0.003 )*(1-ABS
(1-2*y)) 
Influence of irrational 
decision risk from  funders
pi 0.95*x System risk factor
 
Figure 3 Pre-ordering game simulation system
 
In the pre-ordering game simulation system as 
shown in Figure 3, the arrow denotes one factor 
influences another one. x and y in the box denote game 
-ordering 
 
 [35], this paper 
 
 
 
 of backers who 
 
hard-working 
funders 
-ordering price 
inimum cost 
High return 
Low cost 
Low return 
 
backers 
“hard working” 
funders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strategy probability of both sides in 
which are represented by rate variable. 
  denote the speed of change in both sides’ group 
strategy probability, which represented by flow rate
that is, the changes in every decision cycle. 
denotes the exchange rate represented by rate variable, 
which is cumulative increasing or declining during a 
changing trend. C0 denotes purchase price, and it is a 
constant. According to the process in the game tree and 
its equation, we can see that every factor
on    and   .  
 Parameter setting of the simulation system is 
summarized in Table 1. The values of 
set according to the average level of 
market. The initial decision making proportion is set to 
0.5 for both backers and funders. This represents a 
typical normal game state. Players choose strategies 
randomly, because none of them has efficient 
information or experience to support their decisions. 
Particularly, the irrational decision
are also set as random. The format in parameter settings 
follows the coding rules of system dynamics simulation 
software, Vensim 5.0. RANDOM NORMAL (Min M
Mean Stdev. Seed) sets the immeasurable risk factor to 
be subject to normal distribution with the conditions of 
minimum, maximum, mean value, standard deviation 
and initial vale. Thus, the numerical case simulation 
can be tested with dynamic and uncerta
 
5.2 Simulation results 
 
In this section, the simulation results are presented 
to analyze the impact of risk factors on 
decision-making in pre-ordering pledging.  
 
Table 2 Influence degree
Risk 
factors 
Parameters 
Parameter 
variation 
method
Irrational 
decision 
xp  Exp
yp  Exp
Exchange 
rate 
e  
Raise
Fall
System 
risk 
  Fall
To capture the influence of risk factors on 
decision-making, we apply different variation methods 
to their corresponding parameters, such as at 
range, different expectation
degrees. We use six levels to measure the influence 
degree of the four major risk factors
Completely change(C), Extremely Negative effect (EN), 
Negative effect(N), No Significant 
impact(P), Extremely Positive impact(EP). The 
pledging game 
  	 and 
, 
e in the box 
 gives impact 
parameters are 
a real normal 
-making risk factors 
ax 
in risk factors. 
 
 of risk factors 
 
 
Backer’s 
Decision(x) 
Funder’s 
Decision(y) 
 NS N 
 N NS 
 P N 
 C EP 
 C C 
random 
s, risk uncertainties and 
. They are 
effect(NS),Positive 
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influence degree of each risk factor is shown in Table 2. 
The results imply that backer’s irrational decision gives 
negative effect on funder’s decision and vice versa. 
When currency exchange rate rises, backers are more 
likely to make investment decisions and funder’s 
intention to offer high return is weak. However, when 
currency exchange rate goes down, backers completely 
change their investment decisions and funders are more 
willing to work hard and provide good services. When 
system risk uncertainty increases, both backer and 
funder completely change their decisions.  
Besides showing the influence degree of each risk 
factor on decision making, we further analyze the 
backer’s decision-making trend when risk factor is in a 
changing situation. In the following figures, horizontal 
axis denotes the time and the vertical axis denotes the 
strategy penetration of backers and funders. With 
standardization, the value of strategy penetration is 
controlled and ranges from 0 to 1. 1 means that all the 
backers choose to purchase or investment (or all the 
funders choose to work hard or offer high return), 
otherwise, 0 means that no one chooses to take part in 
Crowdfunding. In Figure 4-5, Blue curve denotes the 
decision of backer and red one denotes the decision of 
funder.  
Figure 4 shows backer and funder’s decisions 
under bearish currency exchange rate. With bearish 
currency exchange rate, there is a rapid decline on 
backer’s decision of investing project though the 
funders choose high level of effort and provide good 
services and high return. In this situation, 
crowdfunding will go to the winter period, because no 
more backers want to invest the project. There is one 
way to break this impasse. Funders need to keep on 
providing high service quality and return to backers. 
After a period of time, the probability of backers’ 
investment decision will gradually increase. 
Figure 4 Decisions under bearish currency exchange 
rate 
 Figure 5 shows backer and funder’s decisions 
under bullish currency exchange rate. With bullish 
currency exchange rate, backers’ decision on investing 
project increases. Compared to the situation of stable 
exchange rate, backers prefer to make investing 
decisions. Meanwhile, due to large amount of backers’ 
support, funders can choose to make less effort to 
maintain the sustained crowdfunding. However, this is 
not the most efficient result in crowdfunding activities. 
When currency exchange rate becomes bullish, funders 
can make less effort, but this is not the result of a 
virtuous circle. Figure 5 implies that funders may not 
always offer high return in the game.  
Figure 5 Decisions under bullish currency exchange 
rate 
Figure6 Backer’s decision under different financing 
mechanisms 
Figure 7 Funder’s decision under financing 
mechanisms 
Figure 6 shows backer’s decision under the 
different financing mechanisms and Figure 7 shows 
funder’s decision under different financing mechanisms. 
The blue curve denotes backer/funder’s decision under 
KiA mechanism and red one denotes backer/funder’s 
1
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0
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(Week)Tim
 
1 
0.75
0.5
0.25
0 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Funders : 
1
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0.
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0
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1
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decision under AoN mechanism. 
Let 1  in the AoN mechanism and 0.7  in 
the KiA mechanism. When  decreases from 1 to 0.7, 
it implies the financing mechanism is changed from 
AoN to KiA. Different mechanism corresponds to 
different pledging system risk level. This change 
increases the system risk of crowdfunding platform. 
Thus, decision-making process of the participants 
becomes unpredictable and out of control. Finally, the 
game may change repeatedly and take a long time to 
reach the ESS. Raising the success probability of 
pre-ordering projects may help to offer a low risk 
investment environment in crowdfunding platform. 
Therefore, more backers will participate in the project, 
and successful experience in crowdfunding will be 
improved. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
6.1 Key findings 
 
As an essential part of internet finance, 
crowdfunding plays an increasingly important role in 
today’s economy. The success of crowdfunding 
depends on participants’ decisions. This paper 
combines two classical theories to build 
decision-making models for pre-ordering pledging, 
where risk factors are taken into account. An 
evolutionary game simulation system is built to 
simulate participants’ dynamic decision-making 
behaviors in a risk changing environments. Finally, the 
influence of risk factors on participants’ decision 
making behaviors is analyzed quantitatively in 
crowdfunding. The observations are summarized 
below: 
1) With the internationalization of crowdfunding, 
foreign backers are suffering from the risk caused by 
fluctuation in currency exchange rate. When 
exchange rate drops, investment decisions made by 
foreign backers decline tremendously. In this 
situation, foreign backers are not likely to invest the 
project on the crowdfunding platform. Without 
enough participants, the whole crowdfunding system 
becomes hard to operate. While a rise of exchange 
rate will lead to overheated investment, which is 
caused by the Herd Effect. This may further 
challenge funders’ diligence. 
2) Increasing the project system risk may lead 
participants’ decisions into the process of repeated 
mutual testing and cause ambiguity at the end. A 
stable decision-making process can be achieved if 
only an equilibrium strategy can be found between 
funders and backers in the long-term of repeating 
game. The evolutionary stable strategies from both 
sides determine the final developmental level of the 
decision-making process. 
 
6.2 Managerial suggestions  
 
 The findings of this study also provide useful 
guidance to the crowdfunding platform 
operator/manager who plans to control the risks and 
develop better pre-ordering pledging activities. The 
managerial suggestions for practices are as follows: 
1) Try to spread financial risks, encourage international 
backers’ participation as well as promoting 
internationalization development of crowdfunding 
activities. At the same time, crowdfunding platform 
operators need to establish efficient incentive system 
and more strict rules to help avoid funders’ lazy 
action, which is caused by exchange rate raise and 
pre-ordering backers’ overheated investment. 
2) Try to control the project system risk by applying 
technological means and risk assessment. Guarantee 
a favorable investment environment, an honest 
atmosphere and a positive growing trend. 
 
6.3 Limitations 
 
This paper has several limitations. We only 
analyze the decision-making process of pre-ordering 
activity and take four risk factors into account. Another 
crowdfunding activity referring to equity pledging 
should be considered in future works. The analysis of 
mass decision making process is this paper has ignored 
the individual characteristics of crowdfunding projects 
and participants. Multi-agent simulation may be 
suitable to address these issues. In addition, empirical 
analysis needs to be taken into account for theoretical 
verification. 
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